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Abstract	
An	article	by	Alexandra	Kirsch	accepted	for	publication	in	Cognitive	Processing	
occasioned	debate	among	reviewers	about	broad	methodological	issues	in	cognitive	
science.	One	of	these	issues	is	the	proper	place	of	Popperian	falsificationism	in	the	
interdisciplinary	cluster.	Another	is	the	tension	between	abstract	models	and	
theories	that	apply	to	wide	classes	of	cognitive	systems,	and	models	of	more	
restricted	scope	intended	to	predict	specifically	human	patterns	of	thought	and	
behavior.	The	lead	editorial	in	a	Commentary	debate	invited	by	the	journal’s	editors	
considers	these	issues	from	the	perspective	of	a	pragmatist	philosophy	of	science	
inspired	by	Herbert	Simon’s	classic	(1969)	reflections	on	the	blurring	of	the	
distinction	between	science	and	engineering	in	cognitive	science.	
	
1.	Introduction	
Alexandra	Kirsch’s	submission	of	her	article	‘A	unifying	computational	model	of	
decision	making’	(2019)	raised	interesting	policy	issues	for	the	editors	of	Cognitive	
Processing.	These	were	triggered	by	reports	from	peer	reviewers	that	diverged	
sharply	in	their	recommendations,	but	did	not	revolve	around	the	usual	matters	of	
referee	judgment,	that	is,	factual	accuracy,	and	soundness	of	data	interpretation	and	
analysis.	Instead,	different	reviewers	defended	conflicting	philosophical	views	about	
what	constitutes	a	genuine	contribution	to	knowledge	in	cognitive	science,	and	
about	the	proper	scope	of	a	journal	with	the	specific	mission	of	advancing	
knowledge	of	(mainly)	natural	information	processing.	This	unusual	circumstance	
offered	the	editors	an	interesting	opportunity	to	reflect	on	the	challenges	of	
integrating	the	disciplinary	strands	that	make	up	cognitive	science.	The	Editor-in-
Chief	consequently	requested	the	Handling	Editor	to	initiate	a	Commentary	debate	
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that	begins	with	the	perspective	of	Kirsch’s	referees,	but	will	subsequently	be	open	
to	further	contributions	from	interested	readers	of	the	journal.	
Methodological	disputes	are	ultimately	resolved	by	the	empirical	progress	of	
science,	not	by	philosophical	arguments.	However,	reflection	on	such	arguments	can	
efficiently	guide	research	design	and	coordinate	the	collective	critical	interpretation	
of	new	findings.	Such	meta-scientific	awareness	is	often	particularly	fruitful	in	
scientific	research	clusters,	such	as	cognitive	science,	that	entangle	various	
disciplinary	norms	and	traditions.	
I	will	not	here	review	or	summarise	the	reviewers’	perspectives	as	stated	in	their	
respective	reports.	Nor	will	I	offer	any	critical	view	of	the	modeling	or	
argumentation	in	Kirsch’s	article,	the	scientific	value	of	which	will	be	measured,	in	
the	usual	fashion,	by	the	extent	of	its	influence	on	further	research.	My	purpose	is	
instead	to	place	the	divergence	of	perspectives	revealed	by	the	refereeing	process	in	
the	context	of	a	large	relevant	literature	in	the	philosophy	of	science	generally,	and	
in	the	philosophy	of	cognitive	science	specifically.	
I	proceed	as	follows.	Section	2	reflects	on	a	‘Popperian’	critical	assessment	frame	
suggested	by	one	of	Kirsch’s	reviewers.	I	will	not	pronounce	for	or	against	the	status	
of	this	frame	as	a	guide	to	how	science	‘should’	be	done;	it	is	inadvisable	for	
philosophers	of	science	to	position	themselves	as	arbiters	of	‘proper’	science,	a	role	
which	no	one	has	authority	to	concede.	Instead,	I	will	use	these	thoughts	in	the	
shadow	of	Popper	as	a	basis	for	discussing,	in	Section	3,	the	heterogeneity	of	
conceptions	of	‘theory’	in	different	rooms	of	the	cognitive	science	mansion.	These	
differences	interact	with	orthogonal	distinctions	that	sort	scientific	contributions	
along	a	continuum	from	relatively	purely	descriptive	to	primarily	practical.	This	
contrast,	between	‘pure	science’	and	‘engineering’,	will	be	the	subject	of	Section	4.	
Cognitive	science	incorporates	work	all	along	the	continuum,	even	in	those	parts	of	
it	that	focus	on	natural,	as	opposed	to	built,	cognitive	processes.		Section	5	concludes.	
The	discussion	to	follow	was	reviewed	by	the	other	participants	in	the	present	
Commentary	debate	prior	to	their	preparation	of	their	contributions.	The	Editors	of	
Cognitive	Processing	invite	and	encourage	further	opinions	from	scientific	readers,	
for	consideration	for	publication	in	forthcoming	issues.	
2	Falsifiability	and	empiricism	
The	most	famous	philosopher	of	science	among	scientists	is	certainly	Sir	Karl	Popper	
(1902-1994).	One	reason	for	this	is	that	Popper	was	particularly	concerned	to	
demarcate	science	from	other	activities,	especially	from	‘pseudo-sciences’	that	try	to	
illegitimately	borrow	the	epistemic	authority	that	is	institutionally	conferred	upon	
scientists.	Most	scientists	are	called	upon	from	time	to	time	to	indicate	at	least	
rough	demarcation	criteria:	students	receiving	their	first	scientific	training	often	ask	
for	such	markers,	and	in	a	world	where	highly	visible	and	influential	political	actors	
constantly	incite	people	to	ignore	or	reject	inconvenient	scientific	findings,	a	socially	
responsible	scientist	must	have	something	to	say	when	asked	why	her	professional	
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views	should	be	given	special	weight.	Popper’s	demarcation	criterion,	though	
strictly	negative,	has	enjoyed	a	hugely	successful	mimetic	history.	According	to	it,	a	
necessary	condition	for	a	statement,	hypothesis,	or	generalization	to	be	scientific	is	
that	it	come	attached	with	specified	potential	empirical	observations	that,	if	
discovered	through	a	replicable	procedure,	would	demonstrate	the	statement,	
hypothesis,	or	generalization	in	question	to	be	untrue.	This	is	the	requirement	that	a	
scientific	proposition	be	falsifiable	(Popper	1969).	Popper	does	not	demand	that	the	
scientist	currently	be	practically	able	to	perform	a	falsification	test	or	position	
herself	for	a	decisive	observation.	But	her	claims	must	imply	a	difference	to	some	
clearly	identified	empirically	contingent	state	of	affairs.	
Few	contemporary	philosophers	of	science	still	baldly	pronounce	themselves	
‘Popperians’.	I	will	not	review	the	numerous	respects,	identified	in	the	philosophical	
literature,	in	which	Popper’s	view	is	too	simple,	too	sweeping,	gives	too	much	
weight	to	unrepresentative	exemplars	from	classical	physics,	and	if	taken	literally	
would	exclude	too	much	activity	that	is	obviously	scientific.	Interested	non-
philosophers	can	find	a	good	short	review	of	these	problems	in	Catton	(2004).	At	
the	very	least,	a	viable	Popperian	philosophy	must	incorporate	responses	to	Kuhn’s	
(1962)	historicism,	which	was	the	project	launched	by	Lakatos	(1970)	and	
subsequently	extended	by	numerous	philosophers	of	science.	
Notwithstanding	the	complexities	involved	in	what	preoccupies	philosophers,	
namely	trying	to	exactly	state	a	viable	formulation	of	falsificationism,	contemporary	
scientists	often	defend	and	impress	upon	their	students	a	general	‘Popperian	
attitude’	that	is	unarguably	a	core	part	of	scientific	culture.	Setting	aside	pure	
mathematics	as	a	domain	that	receives	its	own	extensive	philosophical	
consideration,	theory	or	speculation	that	floats	free	of	empirical	implications	is	not	
scientific.	The	relationship	between	a	body	of	theory	and	its	empirical	evidence	can	
be	complex,	non-obvious,	or	take	years	to	clearly	establish;	but	it	is	a	relationship	
that	no	scientist	is	institutionally	allowed	to	disregard.	This	principle	plays	an	
important	role	in	real	disputes	over	the	allocation	of	scientific	resources.	For	
example,	critics	of	string	theory	as	a	unifying	foundation	for	physics	argue	that	it	is	
mathematics	for	which	no	specific	physical	interpretation	is	ever	likely	to	be	
established	on	the	basis	of	experiment.	Many	physicists	believe	that	if	at	some	point,	
string	theorists	cannot	demonstrate	that	this	charge	was	premature,	then	physics	
departments	should	stop	hiring	them	(Smolin	2006;	but	see	Dawid	2014).		
In	my	view	the	most	serious	problem	with	consistently	applying	a	generic	Popperian	
attitude	is	that	the	borderline	between	mathematics	and	empirical	science	is	both	
indeterminate	and	heterogeneous	across	disciplines.	But	fuzzy	boundaries	are	still	
boundaries,	as	long	as	one	can	identify	clear	exemplars	of	work	on	either	side	of	
them.	When	I	referee	papers	in	economics	I	sometimes	recommend	rejection	on	
grounds	that	a	piece	of	work,	however	elegant,	is	economically	empty	mathematics,	
and	I	do	this	with	confidence	despite	recognizing	that	there	are	other	papers	about	
which	a	similar	judgment	would	be	irresolvably	debatable.	
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Let	us	now	descend	from	the	rarified	heights	of	philosophical	generalization	to	more	
focused	concerns	around	trying	to	give	the	Popperian	attitude	(not	the	literal	
Popperian	dogma)	its	due	in	cognitive	science.	
3.	Theory	across	disciplines	
Cognitive	science	is	an	interdisciplinary	enterprise.	That	is,	indeed,	the	entire	point	
of	distinguishing	it	from	cognitive	psychology	narrowly	conceived.	Standard	
histories	of	cognitive	science	present	it	as	a	union	of	elements	of	psychology,	
computer	science,	linguistics,	and	philosophy	of	mind	that	was	forged	in	the	1960s	
and	1970s	as	researchers	acknowledged	deep	structural	isomorphisms	amongst	
information	processing	implementation	in	people,	non-human	animals,	and	built	
computers.	Cognitive	science	arguably	began	on	the	basis	of	a	relatively	unified	
theory,	the	mathematical	account	of	computation	(Lewis	and	Papadimitriou	1981)	
combined	with	the	then-nascent	ontology	of	effective	algorithms	for	Von	Neumann	
architectures	(Knuth	1968).	However,	by	the	end	of	the	1980s	rooms	were	opening	
in	the	interdisciplinary	mansion	that	relied	on	other	foundations:	parallel	
distributed	processing	as	a	generalization	of	perceptron	architectures	(Rummelhart	
et	al	1986),	behavior-based	robotics	(Brooks	2013),	swarm	intelligence	(Bonabeau	
et	al	1999),	artificial	life	(Langton	1989),	cognitive	neuroscience	(Trehub	1991,	
Churchland	and	Sejnowski	1992),	behavioral	economics	(Kagel	et	al	2007),	(cross-
species)	comparative	psychology	(Griffin	1984),	social-ecological	cognition	(Byrne	
and	Whiten	1988),	developmental	cognition	(Wellman	1990),	and	consciousness	
studies	(Baars	1988,	Dennett	1991).		Contributing	disciplines	have	expanded	to	
include	neuroscience,	ethology,	information	science,	economics,	and	sociology.	
In	this	teeming	research	ecosystem,	prospects	for	a	general	theory	of	cognition	must	
now	be	regarded	as	exceedingly	remote.	Most	contemporary	philosophers	of	
science	would	urge	a	relaxed	attitude	to	this	fact	of	life:	the	history	of	science	is	not	
mainly	a	story	of	intertheoretic	reduction	or	unification,	occasional	triumphs	of	
deep	synthesis	notwithstanding	(Mitchell	2009).	Newton’s	great	unification	that	
marked	the	exemplary	scientific	achievement	for	a	couple	of	centuries	was	in	this	
respect	a	false	portent.	In	one	respect,	the	picture	of	science,	and	cognitive	science	
in	particular,	as	an	archipelago	instead	of	a	tower	makes	the	Popperian	attitude	
more	plausible,	since	only	relatively	isolated	theories	can	face	the	tribunal	of	
experience	straightforwardly.	A	relatively	unified	edifice	would	be	a	densely	
connected	‘web	of	belief’	in	which	each	piece	would	gain	support	from	the	rest	and	
none	might	generate	clear	predictions	that	could	be	distinctively	associated	with	
them	(Quine	and	Ullian	1970).	The	Popperian	attitude	could	in	such	a	hypothetical	
context	only	be	easily	maintained	with	regard	to	the	foundations	of	the	entire	multi-
discipline,	and	falsificationism	would	then	amount	to	trying	to	provoke	Kuhnian	
revolution.	That	was	certainly	not	Popper’s	conception.	He	would	thus	likely	be	
encouraged	by	the	state	of	play	in	cognitive	science,	where	relatively	isolated	
theories	do	periodically	get	rejected	based	on	fresh	evidence.	
However,	cognitive	science	is	characterized	by	a	higher	order	of	complexity	than	the	
divergence	of	foundations	on	which	its	proliferation	of	theories	rests.	Contributing	
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disciplines	differ	from	one	another	in	what	their	practitioners	take	theory	to	mean,	
in	the	operational	sense.	This,	I	suggest,	is	one	of	two	key	points	in	diagnosing	the	
conflicting	responses	of	Kirsch’s	referees.	
All	scientists	recognize	that	they	must	simplify	their	descriptions	of	reality	in	trying	
to	produce	generalized	knowledge.	After	all,	we	have	one	perfectly	accurate	model	
of	the	world	available	to	us,	namely,	the	world	itself;	but	mute	holistic	appreciation	
isn’t	scientific	knowledge.	We	need	to	do	analysis,	and	analysis	involves	idealized	
abstraction.	Broadly	speaking,	we	find	two	general	strategies	for	going	about	this.	
Most	disciplines	combine	the	strategies	to	some	extent.	But	for	concreteness	of	
description,	and	with	a	view	to	the	specific	methodological	tensions	that	
characterized	the	reviewing	of	Kirsch’s	paper,	I’ll	illustrate	the	contrast	by	
comparing	psychology	and	economics	as	disciplines	that	are	each	unusually	pure	in	
overwhelmingly	emphasizing	one	abstracting	strategy	or	the	other.	
Psychologists	seek	generalizations	about	processes	they	typically	cannot	directly	
observe,	but	must	infer	from	measurable	effects.	Their	preferred	methodology	for	
trying	to	achieve	stability	and	convergence	in	the	face	of	this	challenge	is	to	have	
developed,	and	to	enforce	through	peer	review	mechanisms,	a	close	record	of	
relationships	between	conservatively	extended	experimental	protocols	and	
theoretical	constructs	anchored	to	measurement	scoring	systems.	Most	readers	of	
Cognitive	Processing	will	be	skilled	operators	and	guardians	of	this	record.	The	
approach	is	derived	from	the	venerable	craft	of	clinical	diagnosis,	where	
practitioners	have	long	needed	to	control	subjectivity	in	conjecturing	underlying	
diseases	and	syndromes	from	manifest	symptoms.	To	this	the	psychologist	adds	
statistical	testing	of	instrument	and	protocol	reliability	and	validity	with	respect	to	
construct	application.	Psychometrics	is,	to	a	first	approximation,	the	statistical	
theory	of	measures	of	construct	validity.	
In	this	context,	psychological	theories	are	essentially	hypotheses	about	which	
constructs	are	implicated	in	the	production	of	which	behaviors.	Hypothesis	testing	
very	naturally	recruits	the	Popperian	attitude	as	a	rationale	for	practical	features	of	
methodology.	Identifying	a	null	hypothesis	and	then	designing	an	experiment	that	
might	refute	it	is	falsificationism	at	work.1	This	encourages	psychologists	to	develop	
highly	trained	and	sensitive	attunement	to	potential	confounding	causal	influences	
identified	ex	ante	during	experimental	design.	In	general,	psychologists	prefer	that	
confounds	that	cannot	be	straightforwardly	controlled	in	linear	regressions	should	
be	shut	out	of	the	lab.	
This	in	turn	inclines	psychologists	away	from	trying	to	discover	‘laws	of	behavior’.	
Many	psychologists	explain	their	aversion	to	large-scale	generalizations	by	noting	
																																																								
1	Philosophers	will	be	quick	to	point	out	that	it’s	not	quite	the	real	thing,	because	
Popper	urged	that	scientists	should	attempt	to	falsify	theoretical	hypotheses,	not	
null	hypotheses.	On	the	other	hand,	since	a	null	hypothesis	is	defined	as	such	by	
reference	to	a	theoretical	hypothesis,	scientists	might	reasonably	regard	this	as	
quibbling	over	semantics.	
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that	human	and	animal	behavior	(and	now	even	behavior	of	neural	networks	and	
multi-agent	simulations)	is	non-deterministic.	But	various	other	disciplines	
(climatology,	for	example,	and	molecular	genetics)	are	comfortable	with	broad-
sweep	generalizations	that	are	stochastic.	The	work	of	the	philosopher	of	science	
Nancy	Cartwright	points	to	a	deeper	explanation	of	psychologists’	scrupulous	
modesty:	to	the	extent	that	a	lab	environment	is	designed	to	protect	phenomena	
from	the	intrusive	confounds	that	contaminate	the	wild	environment,	putative	laws	
governing	the	messy	outside	seem	like	‘lies’	(Cartwright	1983,	1989,	1999).	
Let	us	now	contrast	the	methodology	of	psychology	with	that	of	economics.	To	keep	
the	contrast	within	useful	bounds,	I	will	consider	only	lab-based	experimental	
economics.	The	language	of	‘constructs’	is	foreign	to	economists;	referential	terms	in	
their	models	are	taken	to	be	directly	isomorphic	to	real	objects	and	processes.	Of	
course,	economists	must	simplify	and	idealize	causal	relationships	just	like	all	
scientists.	Their	vehicle	for	performing	this	is	the	structural	model.	Most	of	the	
practical	art	of	experimental	economics	consists	in	developing	tasks	for	
experimental	subjects	with	incentives	for	behavior	provided	in	such	a	way	that	the	
model	can	identify	predicted	changes	in	behavior	that	vary	with	changes	in	the	
experimenter-controlled	incentives.	Apprentice	economists	learn	from	experience	
how	to	design	models	with	‘the	right’	degree	of	parametric	structure:	too	few	
parameters	will	mis-specify	phenomena,	generating	‘specification	error’,	and	too	
many	will	undermine	the	likelihood	of	successful	identification.	Econometrics	is	the	
statistical	theory	of	model	specification	and	estimation.	
‘Theory’,	for	economists,	does	not	refer	to	hypotheses	about	empirical	relationships.	
In	some	respects	economists	think	of	‘theory’	in	the	way	that	mathematicians	do:	
theory	is	simply	precise	specification.	However,	in	light	of	their	methodology	
economists	use	theory	at	two	levels,	to	construct	two	different	kinds	of	models.	At	
one	level	of	theory	are	economic	models	that	specify	causal	channels	(or,	in	more	
metaphysically	humble	language	that	many	economists	prefer,	channels	of	
‘influence’)	in	the	world,	and	at	another	level	are	data	models	that	specify	
relationships	between	obervations	and	inferences	that	can	be	made	about	estimated	
variable	coefficients	under	different	(usually	non-linear)	regression	models.	
‘Theory’,	then,	refers	to	formal	structural	specification	of	some	class	of	systems	that	
are,	relative	to	some	robustness	criterion	across	models	(see	below),	an	equivalence	
class.	When	one	economist	doubts	that	another	economist’s	model	is	‘economically	
significant’,	the	former	will	not	complain	about	a	‘rejected	hypothesis’;	she	might	
instead	say	that	the	project	she	criticizes	is	an	exercise	in	‘mere	theory’.		
Because	economists	estimate	structural	models,	any	unobserved	influence	that	is	
correlated	with	any	variable	in	the	model	amounts	to	a	specification	error	and	will	
generate	biased	estimation	of	regression	coefficients.	Therefore,	when	economists	
think	of	possibly	causally	relevant	factors	during	experimental	design,	they	ideally	
set	up	a	new	treatment	group	arm	of	the	experiment	where	the	factor	in	question	
can	be	independently	varied.	If	observation	conditions	or	budget	limitations	prevent	
this	first-best	approach,	they	will	revisit	their	basic	design	and	their	data	modeling	
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to	ensure	that	the	factor	can	be	identified	and	its	influence	estimated.	So,	whereas	
psychologists	seek	to	exclude	‘confounds’	from	the	lab,	economists	come	up	with	
strategies	to	bring	‘confounds’	into	the	lab.	The	psychologist’s	lab	is	a	bunker;	the	
economist’s	is	intended	to	be	a	microcosm	of	the	world.	
Economists	are	as	reluctant	as	psychologists	to	speculate	about	sweeping	laws.	
However,	in	the	case	of	the	former	this	really	does	mainly	just	reflect	metaphysical	
squeamishness	about	the	idea	of	stochastic	causation.	(The	great	philosopher	of	
science	C.S	Peirce	advised	against	such	anxiety;	but	the	idea	that	a	‘real’	cause	must	
always	exert	its	effects	unless	blocked	by	another	identified	cause	is	a	bit	of	folk	
metaphysics	that	holds	on	even	among	many	physicists;	see	Ladyman	and	Ross	
2013.)	Economists	show	their	relative	immodesty	(by	comparison	with	
psychologists)	about	making	inferences	from	data	in	the	attention	they	give	to	
estimating	cross-experimental	robustness	of	observed	effect	strengths	relative	to	
classes	of	data	models	(Neumeyer	and	Plümper	2017).	Their	concern	with	
establishing	‘external	validity’	of	experiments	(Guala	2005)	reflects	their	practice	of	
trying	to	proxy	the	world	in	their	labs,	rather	than	trying	to	eliminate	all	but	a	
selected	aspect	of	the	world	from	the	lab.	
Psychologists’	emphasis	on	isolated	hypothesis	testing	gives	a	different	flavor	to	
their	empiricism	from	that	of	economists.	Economists’	practice	of	accepting	
observed	effects	because	they	can	successfully	specify	and	identify	them,	and	then	
accepting	them	as	general	causal	structures	when	they	can	specify,	identify	and	
estimate	them	robustly,	is	in	much	greater	tension	with	the	Popperian	attitude.	The	
leading	economic	methodologist	of	the	mid-twentieth	century,	Mark	Blaug	(see	
Blaug	1980)	was	a	committed	Popperian	and	caused	a	generation	of	economics	PhD	
students	to	be	made	to	read	selections	from	Popper	and	Lakatos.	It	is	noteworthy	
that	Blaug	ultimately	grew	deeply	dissatisfied	with	his	discipline,	and	in	his	final	
writings	(e.g.	Blaug	2002)	denounced	its	mainstream	practitioners	for	seldom	
conducting	themselves	as	Popper	counseled.	The	later	Blaug	can	be	interpreted	
without	much	strain	as	wishing	that	economists	did	psychology	instead.	This	proves,	
as	it	were,	the	force	of	the	contrast.	
Kirsch’s	interest	in	specifying	broad	classes	of	heuristics	that	might	characterize	
various	cognitive	systems,	including	humans,	at	an	abstract	level	but	perhaps	not	in	
specific	detail,	would	not	surprise	researchers	who	approach	the	world	in	the	way	
that	economists	do.	Because	they	are	not	shy	about	estimating	‘externally	valid’	
effects,	and	because	they	are	motivated	to	find	the	broadest	range	of	phenomena	
that	are	equivalence	classes	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	model	or	family	of	models,	it	
would	be	natural	for	an	economist	to	be	interested	in	heuristics	that	might	restrict	
choice	behavior	in	both	people	and	various	kinds	of	artificial	systems,	even	if	
processing	details	varied	from	instance	to	instance.	
It	may	seem	odd,	even	to	a	non-psychologist,	to	talk	about	shared	heuristics	that	
might	yet	involve	varying	processing	details.	After	all,	a	heuristic	is	a	restriction	on	
processing	in	the	first	place.	But	specification	can	occur	at	any	of	a	multiple	range	of	
scales	of	exactness.	Suppose	that,	as	a	heuristic	for	not	(indefinitely)	failing	to	notice	
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e-mails	I	every	day	review	all	messages	still	in	my	inbox	from	one	month	ago.	
Suppose	that	you	instead	do	a	daily	review	of	every	message	from	two	months	ago.	
Are	we	using	different	heuristics	or	two	variants	of	the	same	heuristic?	Let	us	
change	the	dimension	of	imagined	processing	difference:	suppose	I	scan	the	set	of	
old	messages	manually,	while	you	subject	exactly	the	same	set	to	search	by	a	
programme	you	wrote	that	checks	to	see	whether	you	acted	on	them.	Are	those	
different	heuristics	because	they	implement	different	algorithms,	or	the	same	
heuristic	because	they	address	the	same	problem,	unreliable	attention	under	
pressure	from	interruptions,	by	the	same	general	device,	a	review	anchored	to	the	
calendar	date?	
Heuristics	have	in	fact	been	studied	by	both	psychologists	and	economists,	
sometimes	acting	in	interdisciplinary	teams	(see,	e.g.,	chapters	in	Gigerenzer	and	
Selten	2001).	All	are	interested	in	the	efficiency	of	the	heuristics	they	study.	
Efficiency,	after	all,	is,	on	some	construal	or	other,	what	makes	a	heuristic	a	heuristic.		
But	psychologists	typically	concentrate	on	a	heuristic’s	efficiency	in	terms	of	how	
much	computational	effort	it	requires	compared	with	alternatives;	whereas	the	
economists	are	more	likely	to	focus	on	the	ex	ante	reliability	with	which	rival	
heuristics	get	the	same	job	done.	These	different	loci	of	attention	will	tend	to	lead	to	
systematically	different	levels	of	specification	of	equivalence	classes.	The	
psychologist	will	naturally	discriminate	at	a	relatively	granular	scale	and	seek	to	
test	hypotheses	that	distinguish	between	variants	at	this	scale,	while	the	economist	
might	aim	to	model	the	widest	set	of	implementations	that	are,	within	the	feasible	
set	given	the	time	or	energy	budget	(i.e.,	the	budget	that	rules	out	the	first-best	
solution	and	motivates	the	heuristic	approach),	equally	reliable	as	solutions	to	a	
common	problem.		
4.	Science	and	engineering	
In	her	paper	Kirsch	cites	Herbert	Simon’s	classic	book	The	Sciences	of	the	Artificial,	
originally	published	in	1969	and	revised	twice	subsequently	(1981,	1996).		Simon’s	
central	question	was	how	there	could	be	a	proper	science	of	designed	systems,	as	
opposed	to	simply	engineering	of	them.	If	we	think	of	science	as	the	disinterested	
examination	of	the	natural	world	–	where	by	‘natural’	people	typically	mean	
‘independent	of	design	by	people’	–	then	it	is	indeed	puzzling	that	we	might	
scientifically	investigate	systems	in	which	the	characteristics	were	chosen	by	people	
in	the	first	place.	
What	the	class	of	designed	systems	that	Simon	discusses	have	in	common	is	that	
they	are	intended	to	optimize,	or	to	reach	a	performance	threshold	short	of	
optimization	that	a	designer	deems	good	enough,	in	conditions	that	involve	adaptive	
interface	with	a	class	of	environments.	By	way	of	contrast,	the	problem	of	building	
an	excellent	toaster	or	car	is	a	relatively	pure	engineering	problem:	the	only	
restriction	on	making	it	as	good	as	you	want	is	cost,	because	neither	toasters	nor	
cars	are	very	sensitive	to	varying	‘interface	conditions’.	This	is	not	true	of	AI	
systems,	or	robots,	or	artificial	markets.	
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There	are	generalizations	to	be	discovered	about	adaptive	interface.	Indeed	there	
are	limitless	potential	such	generalizations	because	adaptive	interfaces	are	scale	
sensitive	and	there	are	no	in-principle	limits	to	the	scales	at	which	an	inquirer	might	
aim	her	interest	and	try	to	solve	her	design	problem.	Discovering	these	
generalizations	is	a	matter	for	science	because	scale	effects	are	typically	non-linear,	
and	the	locations	of	transition	and	inflection	points	need	to	be	found	through	
theoretically	disciplined	experimentation.	
The	sciences	of	the	artificial	blend	into	(some)	sciences	of	the	natural,	because	
biologists	are	also	in	the	business	of	seeking	generalizations	about	adaptive	
interfaces.	It	might	be	said	that	the	systems	studied	by	biologists	–	and,	as	a	special	
case,	by	psychologists	–	are	different	because	they	were	not	designed.	Of	course	it	is	
important	to	stress	this	if	by	‘designed’	we	mean	‘assembled	with	a	preconceived	
end	in	view’.	The	idea	that	biological	systems	were	designed	in	that	sense	is	
creationism,	and	anathema	to	science.	But,	as	the	philosopher	of	cognitive	science	
Daniel	Dennett	(1987,	1995)	has	emphasized,	natural	selection	is	a	kind	of	designer	
in	the	very	important	sense	that	it	conserves	better	solutions	to	problems	and	tends	
to	eliminate	inferior	solutions	to	problems.	Furthermore,	nature’s	solutions	often	
offer	vital	clues	to	engineers	because	natural	selection	runs	prodigiously	long	and	
varied	experiments,	albeit	with	only	rare	instances	where	treatments	and	controls	
are	isolated.		
The	domain	of	heuristics,	Kirsch’s	topic,	is	the	perfect	point	of	convergence	of	the	
sciences	of	the	artificial	and	the	biological	(psychological).	A	solution	to	a	problem	is	
a	heuristic	just	in	case	it	trades	off	some	accuracy	in	completeness	of	representation	
and	/	or	cross-domain	reliability	for	reduced	cost	(in	energy	or	time)	of	processing.	
That	is	the	only	kind	of	solution	that	natural	selection	can	produce	in	principle.	So	
all	of	psychology	is	a	study	of	heuristics.	But	I	said	above	that	the	boundary	between	
the	natural	and	the	artificial,	in	Simon’s	sense,	is	not	clean	or	clear.	The	environment	
in	which	the	specifically	human	mind	has	evolved	is	a	social	environment,	teeming	
since	the	great	encephalization	with	engineered	artifacts.	Humans	are	niche	
constructors	on	an	unprecedented	scale	(Odling-Smee	et	al	1996;	Sterelny	2003),	so	
the	dance	of	adaptation	between	their	minds	and	their	environments	is	co-
evolutionary.	
A	matter	of	awkwardness	for	Kirsch’s	referees	is	that	her	paper	is	vertiginously	
poised	at	what	seems	to	be	an	unstable	or	arbitrary	point	of	engagement	on	this	
fuzzy	borderline	between	the	naturally	selected	and	the	engineered.	She	studies	a	
class	of	heuristics	more	general	than	the	human	mind,	while	wanting	to	make	sure	
that	human	heuristic	processes	are	a	proper	sub-class	of	her	target.	But	her	target	
class	cannot	be	every	possible	heuristic	process,	because	that	would	amount	to	the	
unfathomable	domain	of	every	possible	solution	procedure	that	is	budget-
constrained.	
I	doubt	that	it	is	possible	in	principle	to	pre-isolate	the	class	of	processes	to	which	
Kirsch’s	intuitions	direct	her	attention.	In	Section	3	I	contrasted	the	psychologist’s	
methodology	with	the	economist’s.	It	might	seem	at	first	glance	that	both	of	these	
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methodologies,	in	their	opposite	ways,	avoid	the	arbitrariness	that	seems	to	haunt	
Kirsch’s	project.	The	psychologist,	it	might	be	said,	restricts	herself	to	the	actual	
heuristics	that	natural	selection	produced	in	humans.	Thus	she	avoids	the	problem	
of	an	indeterminate	boundary	in	possibility	space.	The	economist,	on	the	other	hand,	
begins	from	the	mathematically	identified	ideal	solution	space	and	systematically	
introduces	costs,	according	to	a	rational	sequence	governed	by	which	solution	
functions	mathematically	nest	which	others.	Thus	we	have	a	(radically)	different	
procedure	that	likewise	is	safe	from	charges	of	arbitrariness.		Did	Kirsch	provoke	a	
muddled	refereeing	process	because	her	work	falls	into	a	ravine	between	well-
motivated	disciplinary	alternatives?	
5	Conclusion	
In	fact,	I	think	that	neither	the	psychologist’s	apparent	solution	to	the	arbitrariness	
of	the	target	space,	nor	the	economist’s	supposed	way	around	it,	can	actually	hold	us	
on	the	firm	dry	ground	conjured	above.	
First	consider	what	the	psychologist’s	‘solution’	must	assume:	that	we	can	
coherently	aim	to	study	the	heuristics	our	brains	would	have	run	naturally,	by	
themselves,	if	they	could	have	undergone	development	in	a	psychologist’s	lab	
isolated	from	confounds.	This	is	purely	fantastical,	meaning	not	merely	practically	
impossible	but	not	conceivable	with	the	slightest	degree	of	specifiable	detail.	All	
people	have	evolved	the	heuristics	they	use	while	entangled	from	infancy	in	a	
network	of	artifactual	ones.	We	are,	as	the	cognitive	scientist	Andy	Clark	(2003)	
puts	it,	‘natural-born	cyborgs’.		
As	for	the	economist’s	solution,	the	ideal	decision-theoretic	space	is	usually	thought	
to	be	the	axiomatic	expected	utility	theory	of	Savage	(1954).	However,	Binmore	
(2009)	has	recently	forcefully	reminded	economists	of	a	point	Savage	made	to	begin	
with	(and	this	time,	to	judge	from	the	literature,	the	point	is	getting	through).	
Application	of	expected	utility	theory	is	only	‘best’	in	environments	where	all	ex	
ante	uncertainty	can	be	quantified	based	on	prior	knowledge,	i.e.,	by	some	
procedure	other	than	uninformed	conjecture.	These	environments	are	what	Savage	
called	‘small	worlds’.	Humans	use	heuristics	even	in	many	small	worlds,	at	least	
when	these	are	novel	to	them,	but	the	very	novelty	of	such	applications	suggests	
that	natural	selection	might	not	have	pre-selected	them.	In	any	event,	almost	all	of	
the	decision	worlds	of	interest	to	cognitive	scientists	–	psychologists,	AI	researchers,	
and	behavioral	economists	alike	–	are	large	worlds.	There	is	no	end	to	the	useful	
economic	modeling	that	can	be	applied	to	such	worlds,	but	from	the	perspective	of	
being	able	to	elegantly	pre-configure	the	boundaries	of	this	study	domain	
economists	are	in	the	same	position	as	Kirsch.	
So,	I	suggest,	are	we	all.	What	is	the	domain	of	‘cognitive	processing’?	We	can’t	even	
really	say	that	we	know	it	when	we	see	it,	because	sometimes	it	turns	up	in	places	
where	no	one	would	have	expected	it,	e.g.	the	arms	of	octopi	(Sumbre	et	al	2001)	or	
‘zero-intelligence’	traders	in	just	the	right	kind	of	market	(Gode	and	Sunder	1993).	
There	will	be	other	submissions	to	Cognitive	Processing	that	cause	referees	to	
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scratch	their	heads	in	different	ways.	That’s	editorial	life	in	an	adaptively	open	
world.	
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